Living on the Real World

“Civilization exists under geological consent – subject to change without notice.” – attributed (sometimes) to Will Durant.

“If you are afraid to fail, then you should go and become a banker.” Yossi Vardi

“A banker lends you an umbrella when the sun is shining but takes it back when it starts to rain.” – Unknown

The threats that natural hazards pose to communities – though they can be existential – lie outside the time frame of deterministic forecasts. As a result, land-use planning, real-estate development, and other community decisions typically incorporate (average) climatology, data on community demography, economic trends, etc., but often fail to allow for extreme events that might depart from these averages. This unforecastable character of natural hazards opens the door to societal ills. For example, it can encourage unjustified community optimism, and ironically its flip side – fatalism. It also tempts short-term speculators to extract income from the poor while saddling those same poor with the economic losses long-term, when and if hazard risks are actualized. And so on.

Banks and other financial institutions face similar challenges. Start with an inherent banking vulnerability. Banks use short-term deposits to make long-term loans, extending over many years. Depositors are free to withdraw their funds with little or no notice. When depositors do this en-masse, the result is a bank run. Runs on banks can become self-fulfilling prophecies, can spread to other banks, and even bring down entire banking systems. Bank runs were responsible for the Great Depression of the 1930’s. More recently, the 2007-2008 financial crisis saw important financial institutions either fail outright or require bailout. Job losses in the United States alone approached 10 million. Financial markets lost as much as fifty percent of their value. Central banks injected trillions of dollars into the world’s economies to avoid a complete collapse of the global financial system.

In the aftermath, nations and their central banks strengthened old tools and developed new ones to reduce the risk of such calamities in future years. One such measure requires individual banks to analyze and improve their resilience to future shocks through a form of scenario analysis known as a bank stress test. Banks are asked to demonstrate annually that their capitalization can survive a rise in unemployment rate, or a crash in equity markets, or a fall in GDP, etc. Post-2010 imposition of more-stringent forms of bank stress tests caused a lot of grumbling across the financial world, but their value was realized a decade later when the banking sector cruised through the covid pandemic (again, with the help of big cash infusions from central banks).

In a similar way, scenario analysis, though it falls short of providing the predictive timetable for risk that has proved so helpful in aviation, ought to help communities prepare for climate and weather (and even seismic) risks[1].

A (lightly) interactive  Washington Post article from a couple of weeks ago (See if your city is prepared to bounce back from the next climate disaster) provides a feel for this. The authors ask (at the same time providing links to other material):

How do you pick a safe place to live? Climate scientists predict an intensifying barrage of hurricanes, droughts, wildfires, flooding and sea-level rise in many places. These disasters are already threatening, and even demolishing, homes.

They go on to note:

But risk is not all. Resilience, the capacity to rebound from adversity, can matter just as much…

…While there’s no perfect way to measure resilience, there’s a growing body of data to draw from. AlphaGeo helps real estate, insurance and financial firms predict how global climate models translate into local impacts, and how those risks might be offset by factors on the ground, from a city’s finances to how old the buildings are.

We teamed up with AlphaGeo to reveal where and why communities appear best positioned to recover from adversity…

…And we built a tool [allowing you to compare] your city’s risk and resilience scores, and judge its vulnerability in a volatile climate.

The article is worth reading in its entirety; giving the WaPo tool a test drive is enlightening. But chances are good that the experience will whet your appetite for more particulars. You might find that the demonstration model doesn’t cover your location of interest[2]. The demo doesn’t downscale to the neighborhood level, or to a specific business. I may have missed something but it doesn’t appear to extend to other hazards (e.g., seismic risk), and for a comprehensive risk management strategy this should be included. Presumably, AlphaGeo and other providers can and do add all this and more to meet the needs of individual clients.

Community governments – not just private investors – might reasonably be interested in joining the client list.  One barrier might be expense. Another might be lack of the local-level government expertise able to realize the fullest benefit of such information. Another might be the challenge of updating the information to accommodate new land development, infrastructure modifications, lessons learned from other community-level experience, and much more.

Application of artificial intelligence in every aspect of this work promises to be game-changing. And any ability to foresee risk and use the information to forestall disasters would be potentially far more valuable than learning from experience. Numerous institutions – reinsurers, data analytics firms, the World Bank, and others, are exploring this space. NASA and IBM are partnering to offer foundational AI models.

The growing threats posed by natural extremes provides powerful motivation. AI and other technologies offer new means for reducing vulnerability and risk. What is needed is the unity and and will at the community level to take appropriate action.

[1] This is not the first time that this blog has touched on community stress tests. You can find earlier posts via the link here.

[2]For example, it covered many of the places I’ve lived – Raleigh NC, Arlington/Alexandria VA, Princeton NJ, Chicago IL, Boulder CO – but not all; the latter included Sewanee TN (geographically close to Asheville NC and though not directly impacted by Helene socially impacted), Wilkinsburg PA (near Pittsburgh), or Springfield VA (near DC).  

The previous LOTRW post left this question hanging: Why, in the aftermath of natural disasters, do we simply rebuild as before – in the same way, and on the same land – when this perpetuates losses and human suffering?

On its surface, the question seems particularly poignant when compared with the positive experience of the commercial aviation sector, which has seen striking benefits from its tradition of learning from mistakes, and its mantra after each disaster: This must never happen again. Commercial air travel is nearly 100 times safer than it was in the 1960’s.

What accounts for this dichotomy?

The reasons are several. In part, the differences stem from the divergence in the sheer size of the sunk costs and pre-existing investment. The lifetime of the aviation fleet is something like 20-30 years. Estimates are that the industry will invest $3T or more in new planes over such a period. That seems like a lot. But the value of the world’s tangible assets is some one hundred times greater – perhaps $300T. Furthermore, in contrast to the turnover rate for aircraft, some 80% of the world’s current building stock (including a large fraction in housing) is expected to still be around in 2050. Vulnerabilities in the world’s building stock arising from construction or location are expensive to correct.

The disparity in dollars and time frames is reinforced by similarly strong human psychological, emotional, social, and even spiritual attachment to place. When people choose where to live and work, and raise families, safety considerations with respect to natural hazards often take a back seat to job markets, living costs, preexisting family or social ties, and day-to-day quality of life. In the same way, when corporate leaders select the location of a new factory or business, they tend to seek strong labor pools, reliable infrastructure, favorable tax policies and regulatory frameworks, and access to markets, finding these more salient than a community or state’s climate-, weather-, and seismic risks. 

When natural hazards finally do hit, they drive up insurance costs and pummel property values. This can be true even if their risks are recognized and acknowledged. Policymakers and business leaders alike therefore find that making actuarially-sound hazard resilience decisions is increasingly fraught, especially given today’s rise of populism and polarized politics. What’s more, in the past, Americans used to pride themselves on helping the less fortunate. Local leaders could expect national-level help in recovery. But the rising cost of disasters is leading to sticker-shock and to delays or even public reluctance to pay at all. (An example: while I was writing an earlier draft of this this, President Biden was seeking a $100B to fund recent hurricane relief needs. The timing of this request – during a transition between administrations – Is particularly inopportune.) Americans can expect even larger bills to come due in future years.

By contrast, travelers invest little sentiment in choosing an airline. Safety comes first; cost, comfort and convenience trump any love for a particular carrier or equipment. Boeing’s experience with its 737-MAX aircraft provides a cautionary tale.

Aggravating the problems posed by the scale of the natural hazard problem and its accompanying social attachment to people and place is its sheer complexity and fuzziness. Most of the aviation safety issues are clear-cut matters of engineering and materials science – the performance of metals, carbon fiber, and other materials in response to thermal and mechanical stresses over extended periods of time. The major social factors are limited in comparison – primarily involving pilots and air traffic controllers – a select segment of the general population, and highly trained for specific tasks – operating under relatively restricted conditions. The influence of weather is short-term, relatively well observed and predicted, and communicated in crisp clear language to those impacted[1].

By contrast, community resilience with respect to natural hazards is determined by the interplay of politics and economics, involving broad populations, often unaware or oblivious to natural hazard risks, highly mobile, moving into and out of communities on time frames short compared with the risk incidence. In addition, vulnerability of the built environment and critical infrastructure to any natural hazards is poorly understood, relative to the wide variety of possible hazard presentations and their unique particularities to individual communities.

One final sticking point – possibly the most important difference between the natural-hazard and aviation-safety challenges – is the uncertain time factor for the former. The aviation community can reasonably estimate the lifetime of an aircraft mainframe, or significant components, such as a jet engine, based on flight hours, numbers of takeoffs and landings, duty cycles, and other factors. Calculating the return-on-investment (and optimization and scheduling) of maintenance and equipment replacement is routine.

But droughts and floods, hurricane landfall, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions provide little advance notice yet can compromise the futures of settlements and economies in their paths for years or even decades. Consider this hypothetical comparison: a sizable capital investment made in Asheville North Carolina in the 1990’s with a 30-year payout versus a similar investment made in 2023. The former would have recouped the expected return; the latter, not. Yet the risk outlook during the period of the decisions were made would have looked little different. In 2023, who saw Helene’s devastation coming?

In the face of that large – and largely unresolvable – uncertainty, what to do? Is it possible to do better than simply hope to muddle through? More in the next post.

[1]The NTSB has extensively studied social factors such as crew resource management, The Flight Safety Foundation and others have focused on safety problems posed by language on international flights.

On this real world, natural threats and hazards – cycles of flood and drought; hurricanes and winter storms; earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions; and more – are much in evidence. They are not merely features that make Earth a bit more interesting. They are consequential. We need to be clear-eyed about their nature and impacts. They are inevitable, inimical, and irreversible.

Start with inevitable. Extremes are in large part the way the planet does its business. They are not merely incidental – and not entirely without benefit. Fact is, hurricanes make substantial contributions to annual average rainfall in tropical regions. Winter storms contribute to the great polar heat transfers that keep Earth’s cold-season hemisphere warmer and more livable than it would be otherwise. The interplay of floods and drought has shaped the natural ecosystems that support human life. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions reflect the continuing drift and reconfiguring of Earth’s continental crustal masses.

Inimical. That said, the localized and direct impacts of hazards are momentous, and for the most part dire. Earth’s extremes kill. They maim, physically, during the events themselves, and then psychologically and spiritually, through their lingering effects on survivors over the months and even years that follow (think of the analogy to long-covid). They destroy property and disrupt lives and economies. They trigger evacuations, both temporary and permanent. These impacts are most evident to those “in harm’s way,” but they extend across whole regions and peoples. As John Donne said, “no man is an island.” But those of us who escaped the latest event tend to be rather complacent about the unending distress of those struggling to put their lives back together. The result is a fraying of the larger social fabric.

Moreover, these impacts are also almost wholly irreversible. Experts speak of “disaster recovery,” as if it were real, but in fact it’s closer to an oxymoron.  New construction may replace the old that was carried away by flood or consumed in fire, but it’s new construction. A new community may occupy the former disaster site, but it’s made up of newcomers as much or more than by former residents. What we refer to as recovery is more a matter of the unaffected world nearby moving on obliviously[1].

All this creates human tragedy. That’s because it is not Earth’s extremes per se that do all this harm. It is a history of human decision, actions, and inaction that is the proximate cause. Ineffective zoning, and settlement in floodplains and atop seismic zones. Inadequate building codes. Poor construction. Political pressure from business interests. Complacency in the face of poverty and inequity.

And repeated failures to learn from experience and improve things.

After such tragedies, the default response is to rebuild as before, on the prior location (in the floodplain, or on the seismic fault zone).

Muddling through? Repeating a mistake but hoping for a different result? That’s not the stance we take towards other risks.

As one example: take aviation. When it comes to aviation, airframe manufacturers, airlines, and governments learn from experience, and improve design, manufacture, operation and maintenance. Despite an eightfold increase in commercial flights over the past half-century, deaths per year have fallen from the rate of some 1500 per year in the 1960’s to some ten percent of that figure. A commercial flight is nearly 80 times safer today than it was a century ago.

How different from living, say, in Florida’s coastal communities – where warmer climates, more intense storms, and sea-level rise increase disaster risk, and vulnerable infrastructure – roads, electrical power, etc. – make evacuation necessary and return home problematic at best. The dismal rise in property destruction and economic disruption have motivated some, me included (e.g., here, with my colleague Gina Eosco, and again here), to call for an analogy to the National Transportation Safety Board – a notional Natural Disaster Review Board that might mimic the success of the aviation community and make American living safer. In fact, the kernel of such ideas goes back even further. For example, Quarantelli (1987) provides a nice historical perspective on prior work at the National Academies and elsewhere, even extending back to DoD work in the 1950’s. Since then, social scientists have continued to weigh in[2].

Such ideas have failed to receive any traction. Why not? The reasons are many and varied, and in some respects compelling. But perhaps all that could change. More in the next post.

[1]There is something of an analog to this in natural ecosystems. Recall the documentaries you’ve seen on African wildlife. A prey species finds its routine disrupted by a predator attack; after the kill, the cameras pan back to show the prey species grazing seemingly unconcerned within eyesight and easy reach of the predators, as the latter focus on their newly-downed meal. Not unlike those prey species, human beings can sometimes seem resigned – fatalistic – when it comes to natural disaster.  

[2]in 2001, a famous trio of social scientists – Gilbert White, Ian Burton, and Bob Kates – considered the growth in disaster losses in an article entitled Knowing better and losing even more: the use of knowledge in hazards management. They concluded that either (1) knowledge is lacking, (2) knowledge is available but unused, (3) knowledge is available but used ineffectively, (4) there is a time lag between the application of knowledge and the results, or (5) the best efforts to apply knowledge are overwhelmed by the rapid increase in vulnerability, etc. Only possibilities (2) and (3) are considered in this post.

Start with some context. Sea level rise is forecast to shrink the land area of Florida by some 1-10% by the end of the century. Much of this land is in Florida’s south. The area affected includes the Everglades and Miami, but obviously other strips of coastline are vulnerable as well. The property value of the associated real estate is an estimated 2-3 trillion dollars. To protect it will require engineering works roughly comparable to those protecting the southwest low country of the Netherlands. The need is for hazard-mitigation investments amounting to billions of dollars each year. (You can find cost estimates for the Dutch case here). These are not yet evident at the necessary scale in Florida- or federal budgets.

Nothing new here! Easy to read this in few seconds and move on to more urgent matters – for example, the implications of the latest national election results for the national economy in general and Florida property values in particular. But Hurricane Milton’s impacts are prompting some to rethink Florida’s long-term future and the full costs of getting from here to there. A few examples:

A New York Times article sums up the options in three easy-to-understand phrases: fight the water (build sea walls, convert Florida into Holland, or, more likely, its less-successful analog, Venice); live with it (put Florida homes on stilts; leave it to residents to formulate their own evacuation strategies); pack your bags (retreat; easier said than done, because current Floridians loathe the thought of leaving).

A recent British experience with giving the land back to the sea suggests a range of outside-the-box possibilities. It is possible to reimagine Florida as a paradise – not one where large numbers of people live for decades under highly vulnerable circumstances and great expense and risk, but rather a sparsely occupied, more open, more natural site that an entire nation could visit, for restoration and renewal. (Not implying that the American psyche finds such social engineering at all appealing, or that this is even a good idea – just saying.)

A Washington Post article on Florida housing markets reveals a growing gap separating the value of Florida homes deemed at greater climate risk from those on presumably safer ground. Some realtors, buyers, and speciulators are beginning to take note.

Along those latter lines, another Washington Post article interviews two investors who are making these climate risks an integral part of their long-term investment strategy (emulating those who shorted the fishy financial instruments involved when they saw the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007-2010 coming).

Susan Crawford, in a piece on Substack, argues that hazard risks have triggered political responses at state and local levels that put insurance and municipal bonds on shaky financial ground.

This brief list is by no means exhaustive; the fuller literature on these topics must by now be running in the hundreds.

Shining a spotlight on these issues builds awareness, which is by itself a huge step. The publicity makes it harder for savvy but unscrupulous investors to take advantage of the naivete of the elderly seeking escape from harsh winters in their retirement years. Individuals and institutions are left free to explore a wide range of options for their own decisions and actions. The larger society can gauge the success or failure of the myriad efforts and foster those showing the greatest potential.

Florida will not be attempting to meet the challenge on its own. It is and will continue to seek national help. Per se, the Florida problem is not just a statewide dilemma – it’s national. But the national vulnerability to natural hazards is more than a simple question of spreading the risk posed by hurricanes to a single state over the full nation. The other 49 states face risks and vulnerabilities of their own. These include extreme floods and drought, severe warm- and cold-season storms, earthquakes, disease outbreaks and much more. Across our nation, living among the larger population, are the survivors of Katrina, Ian, Helene, the California wildfires, the Loma Prieta- and Northridge earthquakes, and many other named and unnamed disasters. Many of this subpopulation have lost everything (including loved ones) and still decades later are struggling with debt and governmental red tape, trying to rebuild. Theirs is an unending but almost invisible nightmare hidden amidst a land of carefree plenty. Out of respect for them, and to avoid adding to their number, we need to be more intentional (and more effective) in disaster risk identification, reduction, and recovery.

Yesterday’s LOTRW post is reproduced here verbatim, but in its original form — before the ChatGPT transformation of certain sections into unrhymed iambic pentameter. I’m doing this because some readers might be interested in just what was retained and what was lost by ChatGPT’s treatment – and because I want to use the thoughts and links here as a springboard to further consideration of the Florida challenge.

The great English poet John Milton (1608-1674) is most famous for his epic poems Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained^[1].

To help you recall your high-school English literature: Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667) recounts the temptation of Adam and Eve by Satan and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The poem comprises over 10,000 lines of blank verse (unrhymed iambic pentameter – think Shakespeare) in multiple volumes. Paradise Regained (1671), shorter, at only 2000 lines, focuses on Christ’s success in resisting Satan’s temptation.

Now to the present day. Hurricane Milton – carrying its attendant storm surge, high winds, flooding and tornadoes – has come and gone. It was the second-strongest hurricane ever so-far recorded in the Gulf of Mexico. It made Florida landfall on October 10, where it rapidly weakened in intensity, then losing its definition as it passed over the Bahamas on October 11.

But the hurricane’s impacts linger. Fact is, many are only beginning to be felt. In effect, the storm is writing three narratives – and with a bit of help from ChatGTP – in iambic pentameter.

Hurricane Milton’s Paradise Cost. To start, some two-dozen Floridians died. Some context: This is comparable to the Florida death toll from Hurricane Helene. (The total national fatalities resulting from Helene were some ten times higher.) In turn, these losses pale relative to the number of fatalities resulting from the 1928 Okeechobee hurricane, which killed over 2500 (mostly in Florida). Property damages show a different profile over the past century. Estimates put the Okeechobee hurricane losses at half a billion dollars in today’s currency. Hurricane Milton’s property damage appears to be 100 times greater – perhaps as high as $50B. The multi-state total of Helene losses are also in the $50B range.

Hurricane Milton’s Paradise Lost. But that’s only the beginning. Experience and recent science predict that the losses will continue to mount with time. Property loss is distinct from the additive costs of business disruption, which in the modern era are often comparable. At its peak, Milton was responsible for power outages affecting millions of homes. Some six million people were ordered to evacuate. Many businesses have yet to reopen. Workers are slow to return to their jobs. And recent studies of the excess deaths resulting from natural disasters, when teased out from long-term data, show total death rates tenfold greater than those occurring in the immediate event. These are the consequence of loss of home, spend-down of retirement savings to cover uninsured losses, corrosion of community and deterioration of community health- and safety services, the spend-down of retirement savings to cover uninsured losses, increased substance abuse, and more. The toxic political season, fake news, and conspiracy theories about the cause of the hurricane, government relief efforts, and even weather forecasts themselves have added to the misery. All in all, the 2024 hurricane season has changed the view of many Floridians. They may have moved to the state seeing it as a tropical retirement paradise, with hurricanes only a minor (and even unlikely) bother. The succession of events in the 2024 hurricane season paint a picture of Florida not as paradise but as a hotbed of hurricane risk, disruption, and tragedy as the Florida way of life. Some residents are therefore leaving paradise, moving inland or returning northward.

Hurricane Milton’s Paradise Regained. Bad enough, but global warming and sea-level rise suggest worse to come. By 2100, if no action is taken, Florida might be nine tenths its present size. A recent New York Times article sums up the options in three self-explanatory phrases: fight the water (build sea walls, convert Florida into Holland, or, more likely, its less-successful analog, Venice); live with it (put Florida homes on stilts); pack your bags (retreat; easier said than done; residents tend not to like this one). Florida will not be attempting to meet the challenge on its own. It will seek national help. Its problem is not just a statewide dilemma – it’s national. A recent British experience with giving the land back to the sea offers reason for hope – not through slavish imitation but rather in the sense of expanding the range of possibilities. It’s tempting to reimagine Florida as a paradise – not one where a few people live, but rather an open site where an entire nation can visit, for restoration and renewal.

Bottom line? Hurricane Milton was – but, still evolving and developing, will remain – a tragedy. Out of respect to those who died, and those survivors who live, but are living the nightmare of trying make their lives worth living while awash in a sea of government red tape and public oblivion to their plight (because the nation is moving on to focus on politics), we need to think through recovery. We need to do better than rebuild-as-before. That only condemns those who follow to even greater pain and loss. If we are to retain or regain the natural paradise that is Florida and at the same time minimize future suffering, we need to build a new social contract with each other and with the generous but sometimes dangerous and sometimes fragile real world we live on.

[1]Two interesting facets of Milton’s life: First, he wrote these poems while blind (!). Second, federal-employee-readers of LOTRW might take note; Milton’s career included a stint as a civil servant. His job? He was responsible for Latin correspondence for the so-called Commonwealth of England – the name Britons gave themselves during that particularly tumultuous period between the execution of Charles I and the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II. Milton’s circumstances following Charles II’s return to the throne were awkward. Given the parallels to today’s politics, personalities, and great uncertainties, Milton’s experiences and how he survived them might contain instructive lessons.  

The great English poet John Milton (1608-1674) is most famous for his epic poems Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained[1].

To help you recall your high-school English literature: Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667) recounts the temptation of Adam and Eve by Satan and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The poem comprises over 10,000 lines of blank verse (unrhymed iambic pentameter – think Shakespeare) in multiple volumes. Paradise Regained (1671), shorter, at only 2000 lines, focuses on Christ’s success in resisting Satan’s temptation.

Now to the present day. Hurricane Milton – carrying its attendant storm surge, high winds, flooding and tornadoes – has come and gone. It was the second-strongest hurricane ever so-far recorded in the Gulf of Mexico. It made Florida landfall on October 10, where it rapidly weakened in intensity, then losing its definition as it passed over the Bahamas on October 11.

But the hurricane’s impacts linger. Fact is, many are only beginning to be felt. In effect, the storm is writing three narratives – and with a bit of help from ChatGPT – in unrhymed iambic pentameter[2].

Hurricane Milton’s Paradise Cost.

To start, some two dozen Floridians died. 
Some context: this loss compares to that 
Of Hurricane Helene’s toll in Florida. 
The total national deaths were ten times more. 
These losses pale beside the toll of storms 
In nineteen twenty-eight’s Okeechobee, 
Where more than twenty-five hundred souls were lost, 
Most victims found within the bounds of Florida. 

Property damages show a different trend; 
The Okeechobee storm’s loss, half a billion 
In current terms, reveals the cost of storms. 
Yet Milton’s damage reaches far beyond, 
One hundred times that sum, perhaps fifty billion. 
The total losses stemming from Helene 
Are likewise found within that fifty billion range. 

Hurricane Milton’s Paradise Lost.

But this is only just the starting point. 
Experience and science both predict 
That losses will continue to increase. 
Property loss differs from business costs, 
Which in this modern age can match the toll. 
At Milton’s peak, power outages struck homes, 
Affecting millions, six million were told 
To evacuate, and many closed their doors. 
For workers slow return to jobs once held, 
While studies on the deaths from disasters show 
That long-term rates can rise tenfold from strikes. 

These losses stem from homes that once were safe, 
From savings spent to cover what’s uninsured, 
From corrosion of community health, 
And from the rise of substance abuse as well. 
The toxic season of political strife, 
Of fake news, and conspiracy theories 
About the storm, the aid, and forecasts too, 
Have added to the burden many bear. 

The twenty-four hurricane season has changed 
The view of many Floridians who came, 
Believing they had found a paradise, 
With hurricanes as minor, rare annoyances. 
Yet storms have painted Florida anew, 
A hotbed of disruption, risk, and grief, 
Where some decide to leave the sunny shores, 
And move inland or seek the north once more. 

Hurricane Milton’s Paradise Regained.

Yet worse may come with warming and rising seas; 
By twenty-one hundred, if no action’s made, 
Florida might shrink to nine tenths its size today. 
A recent article in the Times suggests 
Three phrases sum up options facing all: 
To fight the water, build the sea walls high, 
Or live with it, put homes upon the stilts, 
Or pack your bags, a choice that’s hard to bear. 

Florida will not face this threat alone; 
It seeks support beyond its borders wide. 
This problem is not just a state affair, 
But rather one that touches all the land. 
A British tale of giving land to sea 
Offers us hope, not through mere imitation, 
But by expanding all the paths ahead. 
It’s tempting to reimagine this state 
As paradise, where many people thrive, 
An open site where whole nations may come, 
For restoration and for renewal.

Bottom line? Hurricane Milton was – but, still evolving and developing, will remain – a tragedy. Out of respect to those who died, and those survivors who live, but are living the nightmare of trying make their lives worth living while awash in a sea of government red tape and public oblivion to their plight (because the nation is moving on to focus on politics), we need to think through recovery. We need to do better than rebuild-as-before. That only condemns those who follow to even greater pain and loss. If we are to retain or regain the natural paradise that is Florida and at the same time minimize future suffering, we need to build a new social contract with each other and with the generous but sometimes dangerous and sometimes fragile real world we live on.

(Posted this day, with apologies to both John Milton and Hurricane Milton – and a tip of the hat to ChatGPT.)

[1]Two interesting facets of Milton’s life: First, he wrote these poems while blind (!). Second, federal-employee-readers of LOTRW might take note; Milton’s career included a stint as a civil servant. His job? He was responsible for Latin correspondence for the so-called Commonwealth of England – the name Britons gave themselves during that particularly tumultuous period between the execution of Charles I and the restoration of the monarchy under Charles II. Milton’s circumstances following Charles II’s return to the throne were awkward. Given the parallels to today’s politics, personalities, and great uncertainties, Milton’s experiences and how he survived them might contain instructive lessons.  

[2] Full disclosure; I’ve made only the most cursory examination of ChatGPT’s work, satisfying myself that it has the feel of blank verse and comes close to the intent and meaning of my original text (allowing for some license). More discerning readers may come away unsatisfied. And I flunked the IQ test of getting a few supporting links into the iambic pentameter. Here they are:

Hurricane Helene

1928 Okeechobee hurricane

Studies on the deaths from disasters

A recent article in the Times

A British tale of giving land to sea

As of this writing, it’s been two weeks since Hurricane Helene made landfall in the Big Bend area of the Florida coast and barreled inland, flooding a 500-mile-plus swath, most notably in Appalachian North Carolina. The known death toll, which now exceeds 200, continues to rise. An additional toll will be exacted from injuries, from immediate health hazards of the flooding, and from the devastating long-term psychological and spiritual damage that survivors will continue to experience over the coming months and years.

News coverage has been extensive. Two pieces illustrate the challenges and give detail of what to expect. The first, from the Washington Post and dated Thursday, October 3, headlines the thousands of uninsured homes in the hurricane’s path. Some excerpts:

…On average, just a tiny fraction of households in the inland counties hit hardest by Hurricane Helene and its remnants had flood insurance, according to a Washington Post analysis of recent data from the National Flood Insurance Program. Across seven affected states,only 0.8 percent of homes in inland counties affected by the storm had flood insurance…

…Experts say that lack of insurance will prove deeply damaging for those households in the years to come, adding to the overall toll of the devastating storm…

… Available disaster assistance funds are largely intended to pay for temporary shelter, food and water — not to rebuild homes. And thanks to a combination of outdated policies and high prices, most people don’t know they should enroll in flood insurance — or can’t afford it.

Without insurance, people struck by floods have to rely on a network of complicated federal programs or aid from nonprofits to rebuild their lives. The Individual Assistance Program, run by FEMA, can help provide urgent resources but is capped at around $42,500 for housing and $42,500 for other costs.Most recipients get far less. 

A second article, published by Rachel Young and Solomon Hsiang in the journal Nature on Wednesday, October 2, and entitled Mortality caused by tropical cyclones in the United States, looks at the health impacts of such losses. That same day’s New York Times provides a readable summary. From the NYT:

Over the past week, the official death toll from Hurricane Helene has surpassed 100 as the vortex creeping inland from Florida submerged homes and swept away cars. But the full weight of lost lives will be realized only years from now — and it could number in the thousands…  

… Looking at 501 events from 1930 to 2015, researchers found that the average tropical storm resulted in an additional 7,000 to 11,000 deaths over the 15 years that followed.

Overall during the study period, tropical storms killed more people than automobile crashes, infectious diseases and combat for U.S. soldiers… 

…The pair used a technique that has also provided a more complete understanding of “excess deaths” caused by Covid-19 and heat waves. It works by looking at typical mortality patterns and isolating anomalies that could have been caused only by the variable under study — in this case, a sizable storm.

Prior research analyzed data over shorter periods and focused on disruption of health care for dementia and cancer patients, et al.

Young and Hsiang, as well as earlier researchers, see the longer-term impacts as understandable in view of home loss, financial stress associated with the spend-down of retirement savings to cover uninsured losses, the deterioration of health and safety services at the community level, increased substance abuse, and more.

Given these realities, it’s not much of a stretch to draw similar conclusions about the financial and health impacts of other disasters such as wildfire and earthquake – and anticipate a future filled with such losses as far as the eye can see.

What is the way out of this downward spiral of repetitive loss and continuing public suffering – of such extent as to compromise the social fabric of the country?

A third article, published just yesterday, provides a hint.

According to the New York Times, North Carolina legislative decisions played a role in their state’s vulnerability. An excerpt:

…The amount of rain that Tropical Storm Helene unleashed over North Carolina was so intense, no amount of preparation could have entirely prevented the destruction that ensued.

But decisions made by state officials in the years leading up to Helene most likely made some of that damage worse, according to experts in building standards and disaster resilience.

Over the past 15 years, North Carolina lawmakers have rejected limits on construction on steep slopes, which might have reduced the number of homes lost to landslides; blocked a rule requiring homes to be elevated above the height of an expected flood; weakened protections for wetlands, increasing the risk of dangerous storm water runoff; and slowed the adoption of updated building codes, making it harder for the state to qualify for federal climate-resilience grants.

Those decisions reflect the influence of North Carolina’s home building industry, which has consistently fought rules forcing its members to construct homes to higher, more expensive standards, according to Kim Wooten, an engineer who serves on the North Carolina Building Code Council, the group that sets home building requirements for the state.

This NYT article is framed in the negative but contains a positive point: to break the vicious cycle of disaster loss and its pernicious effect on America’s prospects will require policy formulation and legislation at state and national levels. And in a democracy, that in turn requires a public that is on the same page and holding its elected officials accountable – not a public that is bitterly polarized and obfuscating very real challenges with misinformation and false facts – all while the disaster survivors live in an unending Groundhog-Day nightmare of misery.

One special psychological and spiritual challenge for Hurricane Helene survivors will be the fleeting national attention to their needs. Americans are well-intended but by tomorrow at this time attention will have shifted to the impacts of Hurricane Milton. FEMA and other national and state agencies, already stretched thin, will have to accommodate an additional set of urgent needs. In a few weeks, the outcome of the 2024 federal and state elections and their aftermath will replace hurricanes as the national focus.

As individuals and a nation, we can and must remain mindful of those among us recovering from disasters and provide sustained help, and all the more so as life moves on.

…following up from the previous LOTRW post, recalling an occasion from nearly forty years ago (stop me if you’ve heard this). The event? An annual NOAA/OAR management retreat sometime in the 1980’s. The NOAA Environmental Research Laboratory directors had gathered in Rockville from across the country, along with DC-based OAR leadership. I was a newly-minted and not-quite mainstream member of the group. The ERL lab directors were all in the Senior Executive Service – they’d been grandfathered-in when the SES had been established a few years prior. I was head of a newly established entity by the name of the Environmental Studies Group. It was a stuff-bag of diverse pieces of research that formerly had been reporting directly to the ERL Director, cluttering his organizational chart and distracting him from larger concerns. ESG comprised a climate research group, busily developing and curating the COADS data set; a weather research program area, studying warm-season mesoscale convective storms; a Weather Modification Program Area (a Congressional earmark); and PROFS, an R&D program actively shaping development of the 1980’s NWS Modernization and Associated Restructuring (and now imbedded within NOAA’s Global Systems Laboratory). In aggregate, ESG was larger than any of the formally titled laboratories, both in terms of budget and staff. However, I was not SES. I was a lowly GM-15[1].

The laboratory directors and OAR management had spent the first full day hearing from NOAA management on agency priorities; highlighting ongoing research programs and budgets; scheduling the mandated periodic reviews of the individual laboratory activities; considering possible budget initiatives to propose for the coming year, and more. At the end of the formal day, they adjourned to another conference room in the meeting hotel, there to enjoy a dinner, followed by an evening session. This latter was more relaxed, contemplative and forward looking – discussion of other-agency R&D; the national and international political scene; etc.

One topic that came up was the abiding challenge of maintaining and improving coordination and  cooperation with the other, more operational NOAA Line Offices (NWS, NOS, NMFS and NESDIS –dealing with weather, ocean, fisheries, and satellite services respectively). The problem was framed as the challenge of balancing the long-range, basic-research mission of the laboratories versus the short-term, often crisis-driven priorities and concerns of the service organizations. A real conundrum.

As a distinctly junior member of the team, I’d been silent most of the day, but at this moment I thought I had something to offer. Taking a deep breath, I spoke up: “You know, when we are considering promotion of one of our individual researchers, we ask for six letters of reference from academic researchers in the same field. We seek feedback on creativity and originality, the presence or absence of guidelines on their work, their national and international reputation, etc. One key question the academics are asked is this: ‘at your university, would you would consider this government researcher to be at the level of full professor (if we were considering a promotion to GS-15)? An associate professor (if we were considering promotion to GS-14)? Or assistant professor (GS-13)?’”

I continued: “We know in our hearts most academics look down on government researchers anyway (at least this was true in the 1980’s). And how much new information does that sixth faculty letter supply on the margins? How about we replace that sixth letter with the requirement that our researcher in question get one letter of similar assessment/support from someone in the one of the service line offices of NOAA? We could ask whether this person’s work has been useful to their past and present services? Whether they consider its continuation critical to Line Office goals and efforts? Just one letter out of the six! The effect of this on the work and priorities of our researchers would be essentially instantaneous. In the same way they’d been cultivating a support group among academics, they’d start to build a following somewhere in or across NOAA. And this change in behavior would be accomplished at zero cost.”

As I said, the laboratory directors were a senior, strong, fiercely independent bunch. Some were members of the NAS or the NAE. Some had honorary degrees. They weren’t shy or timid. They had the strength of their convictions. As a result, whatever the topic throughout the day, they had been arguing – no, let’s say “animatedly debating”.

Maybe it was the end of the day. Perhaps the convivial dinner conversation had had its effect. But, whatever the reason, my humble suggestion brought them together, created unity, for the first time since the sun had come up that morning.

They all quickly agreed it was the worst idea they’d ever heard.

________________________________________

As you might guess, my idea had no impact, at least at the time. Today, with emphasis on or application readiness levels, as adopted not only by NOAA but other agencies, and additional metrics, the problem may have taken care of itself. But to me, the idea still seems sound.

And speaking of impact (the subject of this post), as you can also tell, the incident didn’t have a negative impact on me personally. I wasn’t wounded. I’m not still talking about it forty years later. I’m not still nursing a grudge…  😊

[1] Management blamed the ceiling on SES slots; initially I chafed at this, but it turned out to be a huge positive. During that period of years, when it came time for annual performance reviews, my leaderhip was compared against SES’ers, and my performance was always deemed pretty good for a GM-15.

“Everybody talks about impact, but nobody does anything about it.[1]”

Have admired David Guston and his political science/policy research from afar. You should too – but probably from way closer-up.

By way of helping you decide whether you want to do just that, consider one of his recent publications – a short article in the Summer 2024 edition of NASEM’s Issues in Science and Technology, entitled What We Talk About When We Talk About Impact. This is by no means his most significant work (his c.v. lists half a dozen books, myriad book chapters, over thirty peer-reviewed publications, and an extensive body of editorial pieces, spanning a broad range of topics). But like his other perspectives, this is robustly structured, meticulously crafted, a fascinating read – and addresses an important subject – impact. We all want our work to matter – and matter more. David Guston shows us how.

Impact has a long history, and even a prehistory (before there was the word, there was impact – think Chicxulub). With great oversimplification, “impact” became a thing for scientists when science became expensive and started depending on financial support from the public – mostly non-scientists. Scientists had to start explaining the value of their work to people who by and large were making less money than scientists and struggling to make ends meet. Immediately after World War II, the value of science and technology was obvious. The atomic bomb, radar, and penicillin had helped the Allies win the war. There was a honeymoon period. Scientists said, “give us lots of money and don’t ask too many questions or interfere, and someday you’ll be glad you did.” Remarkably, both sides to this social contract kept their part of the bargain (and benefited commensurately) for decades.

But as costs have mounted and competing claims for public funds emerged, the bloom has come off this rose. One milestone: in the late 1990’s the National Science Foundation required proposals to address not only the intellectual merit of the proposed work but also the broader impact. Scientists had long accepted the need to justify the former but at first resisted and have never really embraced the latter.

You could see that problem coming. An on-the-ground-experience from the 1970’s: I was a branch chief in NOAA’s Wave Propagation Laboratory. We developed remote-sensing techniques for observation and study of the atmosphere. We were good at what we did and knew it. We had swagger. We had a great laboratory director – C. Gordon Little, a man of scientific acumen, integrity, and vision. Morale was generally high, but there were a few rumblings about rank and promotion and fairness. In response, Gordon decided that each of us (130 strong) should anonymously rank every lab employee, including ourselves, on “their net positive impact (otherwise undefined!) on the laboratory.” He decided further that the employee survey results and the branch chief results (there were seven of us) should be separately tabulated.

We all thought (especially the handful of us in management) his idea insane. The lab groups were diverse (acoustic-, optical-, radar-, radiometry- atmospheric studies, etc.). The work ranged from remote-sensing theory to technique development to application in research to tech-transfer-to- the-service-providing-elements of NOAA or other federal agencies. Some WPL groups and employees were largely NOAA-funded; others funded primarily by other agencies. Absent any specificity to the “impact” criterion, the rankings would be entirely subjective. The results would surely prove divisive and tear the laboratory apart! But Gordon persisted.

The results were amazing – almost miraculously so. The 130 employees, including the managers, were ranked. The variances for the rankings were miniscule. No one had a variance greater than one position up-or-down in the rankings. The managers were high or at the top of the heap; and there was no detectable difference between the managerial rankings of the staff and the overall peer ranking of the staff. The mood at the debriefing was remarkably celebratory[2].

But – germane to the broader impacts discussion here – in the Q&A near the end of the meeting, Gordon was asked how he would evaluate any work on the tech transfer element of the laboratory’s mission. He casually remarked – “well, by definition, we would wait until there had been actual uptake of a technology by some NOAA services line office or another federal agency.”

Perhaps a dozen members of the lab were immediately dismayed. They knew full well that this process took years, not months, if it happened at all – and was subject to the vicissitudes of politics and funding and wholly out of WPL’s control. Gordon quickly walked back his statement, but some damage was done. At least one of our rising stars in such work left the lab to take a job in another institution not long after.

To use a football analogy (after all, it’s that season), this was a fumble on the five-yard line.

Back to David Guston.

David Guston provides much-needed help. He lays out a thumbnail history of impact. He identifies ways research has impact: directly shaping policy goals and language; changing general thinking;  education and training of professionals; interaction with lay knowledge (offering explanatory detail on each of these).

But it’s the evaluation, the measurement of impact that he gives the most attention. He points out the many difficulties of evaluation, but instead of throwing up his hands in dismay he provides a framework that allows approach to the challenge with the same discipline scientists apply to their core research areas. He gives attention to the pathway between the research in questions and societal outcomes (a so-called knowledge value connective or KVC). And he provides an impact catechism (and links and references to a universe of proto-catechisms, themselves of interest) – a set of questions to be applied to the research:

• What kind(s) of impacts (category/type) are you aiming at?
• What scope (extensivity) and depth (intensivity) of impact are you planning for?
• What specific audience(s) are you addressing or constructing?
• What (causal) model do you have in mind for creating impact?
• How are you creating opportunities for impact?
• Who or what (KVC) connects your outputs to impacts and outcomes?
• How are you participating in, researching, or keeping track of (intermediate) impacts along the way?
• How will you tell the story of the impact that you have with humility and accuracy?

And speaking of humility (as in the last bullet), Guston doesn’t present these questions as prescriptive, let-alone holy writ – he’s merely saying that if as a starting point researchers ponder these questions as applied to their work, if faculties and other research groups discuss them, out of those conversations will flow a more robust understanding of “impact,” its worth as a concept, and the worth of research in light of that concept[3].

A kind of DIY approach to building and articulating your impact in a way that will allow you to stand tall versus hem-and-haw.

The idea bowls you over, doesn’t it?

[1] With apologies to Charles Dudley Warner, who made the same observation about the weather (and Mark Twain, who usually gets the credit for it).

[2] In hindsight, I think this positive result has a lot to do with the attention lab management gave to promotions and career development – unmatched by any other group in my professional experience. We dealt with promotions at least quarterly. Branch chiefs would prepare promotion packages, promoting, say, someone from GS-12 to GS-13. There would be a group discussion of the individual case. Then there would follow two discussions: is this the GS-12 from the lab we would choose to be promoting at this time? Where does this person rank relative to the current GS-13’s? The process put a spotlight on branch chiefs who were either too slow or overeager to recognize their talent. Branch chiefs out of line with consensus would be encouraged (sometimes told) to either hold back an action for a quarter or put forward an overdue action at the next quarter.

[3] And perhaps an improved catechism

Mention science diplomacy to a geoscientist or a social scientist focusing on Earthly matters, and you’ll likely bring to mind the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or IPCC (consider, e.g., the reader’s comment with respect to the recent LOTRW post revisiting this topic[1].)

And justly so. Since 1988 this United Nations body has produced “regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation.” The multiple efforts have involved thousands of scientists, diplomats, and national leaders as authors and reviewers. They’ve galvanized world action on climate change – and garnered the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize along the way.

But we are likely on the threshold of far larger diplomatic and global efforts stemming from science advance. Consider just a single example: the United Nations’ Global Digital Compact. Here’s some background, taken verbatim from that website:

Following the political declaration adopted at the occasion of the United Nations’ 75th anniversary in September 2020, the Secretary-General in September 2021 released his report Our Common AgendaPDF. The Common Agenda proposes a Global Digital Compact to be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024 through a technology track involving all stakeholders: governments, the United Nations system, the private sector (including tech companies), civil society, grass-roots organizations, academia, and individuals, including youth.

The Global Digital Compact is expected to “outline shared principles for an open, free and secure digital future for all”. The Common Agenda report suggests issues that it might cover, including digital connectivity, avoiding Internet fragmentation, providing people with options as to how their data is used, application of human rights online, and promoting a trustworthy Internet by introducing accountability criteria for discrimination and misleading content. Find out more here.

(That final link is to a PDF file that offers a bit more detail. Tellingly, it makes a direct comparison to the UN work on climate change, referring to the two issues as seismic shifts that will shape the 21^st century.) The Wikipedia article on the Global Digital Compact provides additional context, including a list of key aspects:

1. Connectivity: Ensuring that all people, including schools, have access to the internet and digital tools for connectivity and socio-economic prosperity.
2. Internet Fragmentation: Preventing the division and fragmentation of the internet to maintain a unified global digital space.
3. Data Protection: Providing individuals with options for how their data is used and ensuring their privacy is respected.
4. Human Rights Online: Applying human rights principles in the digital sphere, including freedom of expression, privacy, and protection from discrimination and misleading content.
5. Artificial Intelligence Regulation: Promoting the ethical development and use of artificial intelligence in alignment with shared global values.
6. Digital Commons: Recognizing digital technologies as a global public good and encouraging their development and use for the benefit of all.

Whew! Giving the attention needed to any individual topic, considered on its own, constitutes a heavy lift. In aggregate, the work is truly daunting. And note that the Compact is limited entirely to the peaceful use of digital science and technology. Diplomatic activity with respect to digital threats is conducted under the label of cyber security. UN activity here is the province of a separate Office of Counter-Terrorism.

Bottom line? It doesn’t take much imagination to see that the task of sorting out all the ramifications of digital science and technology for diplomacy requires urgent attention from large numbers of scientists and technologists of every stripe, from every country, from governments, private sector, and civil society.

This is a two-edged sword. For scientists who love the discipline of their science but wish the work offered more and deeper interpersonal contact and relationships on a daily business, a host of fulfilling, meaningful careers beckon. Science diplomacy is an opportunity.

But for scientists and engineers of the more traditional, discipline-focused, academic sort, the need for international attention to and regulation of digital science and technology imposes an additional overhead. Researchers already spend too much of their time on academic red tape, constant proposal writing, the special problems of foreign students, and more. For researchers, science diplomacy is a burden.  

And climate change and digital science don’t by any means exhaust the need for science diplomacy. It overlays every global endeavor and aspiration: food-, water-, and energy resources; public health; global commerce; etc.

Science diplomacy, much like science itself, appears to be an endless frontier.

[1] You can find some of the LOTRW posts on this topic from previous years here.